لخّصلي

Syria

Let's start with the good news: Bashar al-Assad's dictatorship has fallen.As regime defences crumbled, Moscow and Tehran appeared to have accepted HTS's guarantees that Iran could safely pull assets out and Russia pull back to its Mediterranean port at Tartus or air base in Latakia (whether Russia will keep the port and base, which serve as hubs for its operations in Africa, is unclear).Assad, banking on the continued support of Hizbollah, Iran and Russia, neglected his own forces, relying on conscripts, poorly paid reservists, and predatory militias.The truce left Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaeda affiliate that had broken with the global jihadi movement, in charge of Idlib province.In 2020, Turkey sent in troops and struck a deal with Russia, which used its ties with Assad to halt an assault on Syria's north west that Ankara feared would drive millions more refugees into Turkey.The Syrian army's rout owed partly to the well-drilled force that HTS had assembled and partly to the regime's own decay.

Syria

Let’s start with the good news: Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship has fallen. Syria could get back on its feet after one of the world’s bloodiest recent wars. But plenty could go wrong.

For several years, a stalemate had prevailed. In 2020, Turkey sent in troops and struck a deal with Russia, which used its ties with Assad to halt an assault on Syria’s north west that Ankara feared would drive millions more refugees into Turkey. The truce left Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaeda affiliate that had broken with the global jihadi movement, in charge of Idlib province. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) held the north east. The world mostly thought the war was over and Assad had won.

Then, on 27 November, HTS struck, advancing from Idlib and, apparently to their own disbelief, taking Aleppo, the country’s second city, with little fighting. From there, they marched south, moving into Damascus on 8 December. A regime established by Assad’s father and that had ruled Syria for 54 years fell in less than two weeks.

The Syrian army’s rout owed partly to the well-drilled force that HTS had assembled and partly to the regime’s own decay. Assad, banking on the continued support of Hizbollah, Iran and Russia, neglected his own forces, relying on conscripts, poorly paid reservists, and predatory militias.

Seeing his weakness, Assad’s external backers stood by as rebels advanced. Most Hizbollah units that had defended the regime had, in any case, returned to Lebanon to fight Israel, where they suffered heavy losses. Iran, itself stinging from Israeli blows, could not come to Assad’s aid. Russia, whose airpower had turned the war’s tide nearly a decade ago, was bogged down in Ukraine. As regime defences crumbled, Moscow and Tehran appeared to have accepted HTS’s guarantees that Iran could safely pull assets out and Russia pull back to its Mediterranean port at Tartus or air base in Latakia (whether Russia will keep the port and base, which serve as hubs for its operations in Africa, is unclear).