لخّصلي

Theme: Military-political union of Kabarda with the Moscow state in the 16th century

1. 
   

   Prerequisites for the Russian-Kabardian military-political alliance

   
   


2. 
   

   Adyg’s diplomatic embassies to Moscow in the 1550s.

   
   


3. 
   

   The content and significance of the military-political alliance and its dynamics.

   
   


4. 
   

   Development of Russian-Kabardian relations in the second half of the 16th century.

   
   


5. 
   

   By the turn of the XV - XVI centuries the international position of the Circassians was determined by the existence of two political blocs that resulted from the conflict between the former estates of the Golden Horde. First, the Crimean Khan Mengli-Girey entered into an alliance with the Grand Duke of Moscow Ivan III (1462-1505), who pursued a policy of creating a centralized Russian state and in 1480 refused to pay tribute to the Great Horde. Secondly, these are the Horde khans in alliance with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which competed with Moscow for power over the appanage Russian principalities. The Adygs made a significant contribution to the defeat of the Great Horde, although they did not enter the established political coalitions.
   In the new conditions for the Crimean Khanate, the main rival in the development of the geopolitical space of the former Golden Horde is now its former ally, Moscow Russia. Since 1505, the campaigns of the Crimean Tatars to the Russian outskirts began to be made regularly.
   The Tatars continued to raid the Russian regions, both from the Crimea and from Kazan. To protect itself from these raids, the Moscow government was forced to annually send an embassy to Crimea with tribute and keep troops on the Oka to repel sudden attacks.
   In the strategic plans of the Crimean Khanate, the Adygs possessions occupied a special place. Firstly, only by pacifying the Circassians and forcing them to recognize the authority of the Crimea, one could hope for a successful offensive policy in the Lower Volga region. Without this, it was impossible to establish convenient and safe communications with Astrakhan. Secondly, attracting the warriors of the Adygs principalities to their side practically doubled the strength of the Crimean Khanate.
   In 1515, the Turks laid two fortresses on the border of Circassia for protection from the Circassians - Temryuk at the mouth of the Kuban and Kizil-Tash on the Adakhun island, bounded by the Kuban and Adagum rivers and the sea coast. At the same time, the Crimean khans allocated numerous military contingents to cover the fortresses under construction from the attacks of the Circassians.
   It was a difficult period for Kabarda, when it had to defend its positions not only in the struggle against the Crimean and Astrakhan khanates, but also against strong feudal possessions in Dagestan.
   In 1545, the 60 thousandth army of the Crimean Khan Sahib-Girey made a devastating campaign against Kabarda. The Kabardians, who were standing in Pyatigorye with koshes on their arable lands and were taken by surprise by the Crimeans, suffered significant losses. According to folklore data, exhausted by the constant attacks of small Adygian detachments, the army of Sahib-Girey is defeated in the decisive battle.
   Victories over the Crimean Tatars strengthen the position of the Kabardian princes in international relations. Concerned about the beginning contacts of the Circassians with Ivan IV, as well as the stubbornness with which the Kabardians defend their interests in Astrakhan, in 1553 the Crimean Khan Devlet-Girey attacked Kabarda.
   The Supreme Prince of Kabarda Temryuk Idarov is taking unprecedented measures to consolidate internally and strengthen the foreign policy positions of Kabarda. The most radical among them were the steps aimed at rapprochement with Russia.

   
   


6. 
   

   Around the 1540s, Prince Temryuk Idarov was elected the supreme prince of Kabarda. Temryuk directed his efforts to strengthen his position in the Caspian region, a region strategically important for Kabarda. Continuing the tradition of dynastic marriages, which occupied an important place in the foreign policy of Kabarda, he gives his daughter Altynchach for the Astrakhan "prince" Bekbulat, and his other daughter Malkhorub for Tinakhmet, one of the sons of Ismail, the ruler of Big Nogai. But in the long term, these measures could not serve as a guarantee of the security of Kabarda. Therefore, Temryuk is increasingly inclined towards an alliance with the Moscow state, which no less needed strong allies in the Caucasus.
   Temryuk Idarov was well aware that this alliance could further strengthen the position of Kabarda not only throughout Circassia, but also in relations with neighboring states and peoples.
   During 1552-1561, an intensive exchange of embassies took place between many Adyg’s owners and the Moscow state, negotiations were underway for mutual assistance and support, primarily military.
   First, through the official embassies, the princes of Beslaney and Zhanety, who most of all experienced pressure from the Crimea and Turkey, turned to the Moscow sovereign.
   The first news of the conversion of the Adygs (Circassian) rulers to Moscow reached us in the Nikon Chronicle, which says that in November 1552 they came to the Tsar with a request for patronage. The embassy was headed by the Beslaneev prince Maashuk Kanukov and the Abaza owner Ivan Ezbozlukov.
   In August 1555, a new Adygeyan embassy arrived in Moscow. It was headed by the Zhaneev princes Sibok, his son Kudadek and brother Atsymguk, as well as the Abaza prince Tutaryk Ezbozlukov.
   As a result of the negotiations, allied relations of a number of Western Adig principalities (Zhanety, Beslenei, possibly Temirgoy) with Moscow were formalized, but these relations did not provide for the inclusion of Circassia in the state borders of the Russian state.

   
   


7. 
   

   The agreement with the Adygs created an advantageous position for the Russian state in relations with the Crimea. So, upon receipt of news about the Crimean campaign to the North Caucasus in 1555, it was decided to send a 13-thousandth army headed by I.V. Sheremetev to distract the Tatars from their new allies and from Astrakhan.
   Diplomatic relations between Circassia and Rus became more active and developed especially broadly in 1557, when the Beslenei prince Maashuk Kanukov, the Janeyev prince Sibok Kansaukov and other owners arrived in Moscow with a large Adygean army to serve.
   Following them, in July 1557, an embassy headed by Prince Kanklych Kanukov arrived to Ivan IV on behalf of the Supreme Prince of Kabarda Temryuk Idarov with specific requests for help and military cooperation. This event raised the level of Russian-Adyg relations to new heights.
   The result of the Russian-Circassian negotiations was a military-political alliance, which determined the place of Kabarda in the political space of the North Caucasus for many decades to come. If necessary and as far as possible, the Moscow state and Kabarda pledged to provide each other with military assistance in the fight against external and internal enemies and to carry out military service for this purpose on the territory of the union state. This laid the foundation for an alliance of vital importance for both countries, which became an impressive response to the threats posed by the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate, Poland, Sweden, Iran and other neighboring states.
   The agreements between Kabarda and Russia arose and did not function as a one-time act. They were worked out and formed gradually, over two or three decades, and not only in the course of negotiations and the signing of relevant agreements, but also in the practice of the military community. Already at the very beginning of the exchange of embassies, in the summer of 1555, the army of the boyar I.V. Sheremetev was sent to the steppe to meet the troops of the Crimean Khan in order to distract them from the campaign against Kabarda.
   Adygs in 1558 take an active part in the actions of the Russian troops in the outbreak of the Livonian War. The documents of that period say that the Circassian princes with their squads acted in the advanced regiment, headed by the Beslenei prince Maashuk Kanukov.
   In 1560, at the request of the Kabardian princes, Ivan IV sent an army led by the governor Ivan Cheremisinov on a campaign against the Dagestan shamkhal, a longtime enemy of Kabarda. At the same time, everything possible is being done so that Temryuk could prevail over his political opponents from among the Kabardian and other North Caucasian owners.

   
   


8. 
   

   The breakthrough in Russian-Kabardian relations was sealed in 1561 by the marriage of Ivan the Terrible to the daughter of the supreme prince of Kabarda. A year after the death of his wife Anastasia, he married the youngest daughter of Temryuk Idarov Guashany (Kuchenyi). The wedding took place on August 21, 1561 in Moscow.
   Ivan IV's wedding gift was a golden dish decorated with floral ornaments, a two-headed Russian coat of arms and an inscription dedicated to the Tsarina and Grand Duchess Maria. Now this dish is kept in the Armory Chamber of the Moscow Kremlin. Ivan IV established for Maria Temryukovna a gold ring seal with the image of the Russian state emblem, and the inscription "Tsarina and Grand Duchess Marya seal", which she used in correspondence with her husband (today the seal of Maria Temryukovna is kept in the State Historical Museum in Moscow).
   The marriage union of the tsarist family of Russia and the supreme prince of Kabarda became a continuation of the military-political union, a symbol of the strong connection between the two countries.
   During this period, the Moscow government is doing everything possible to strengthen the position of its new ally. In September 1562, in connection with the aggravated situation in Kabarda, which threatened the dismissal of Temryuk, Ivan IV sent there from Astrakhan 500 riflemen and 500 Cossacks, headed by Grigory Pleshcheev, who was ordered to be at the complete disposal of Temryuk and obey him in everything.
   Taking advantage of such support, Temryuk entered the rebellious Kaitukin's Kabarda and defeated the combined troops of Kaituko Beslanovich and his son-in-law Kazy Urakov, the ruler of the Small Nogai Horde.
   At the end of 1566, he sent his son Mamstryuk to Ivan the Terrible in Moscow with a request to build a fortress at the mouth of the Sunzha River at its confluence with the Terek. Very quickly - within a few months (in 1567) the fortress was erected, existed until 1571 and was demolished under the pressure of Turkey. In 1588, after the death of Temryuk and Ivan the Terrible, a new fortress was built on the left bank of the river Tyumenki in the Terek delta, a few kilometers from the Caspian Sea. The number of Russian archers in this fortress at different times reached from 500 to 2000 people, not counting the Cossacks.
   From the very beginning, Russia, unlike Turkey, built its relations with Kabarda, recognizing and respecting its independence. The position of unconditional recognition by the Moscow state of the independence of Kabarda, adopted during this period, remained until 1763. Moreover, in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries Russia emphasized in every possible way that the claims of the Crimea in relation to the Kabardians were groundless. For more than two centuries, Russia has acted as a country that firmly and consistently defends the interests of Kabarda. Consequently, there is no doubt that initially and in the long term, the allied relations between Ivan IV and Temryuk Idarov were mutually beneficial, creating conditions for further partnership.

   
   

An important component of Russian-Kabardian relations during this period was the activity of the Cherkassk - princely families, formed from representatives of the Adyg’s\ aristocracy who went to the Russian service. From that time on, they, in the rank of service princes, joined the ruling class of the Moscow state, and many of them showed themselves brightly in the political and military arena. The most famous were the Kabardian Cherkasskys (Temryukovichi, Kambulatovichi, Sunchaleevichi) - the descendants of the sons of the Kabardian prince Idar. In addition, there were branches of the Cherkasskys belonging to other Adyg’s ethnic divisions - the Beslaney's and the Zhaney's, namely the Akhamashukovs, the Egupovs and the Chyumakhovs-Cherkasskys.
Departures for the tsarist service in Moscow took place in strict accordance with special rules. The decision to send was made at a meeting of princes. Usually, among those leaving were young princes of 16-20 years old, who were accompanied by a retinue as part of a nearby uzden, educator, and bodyguards. So, together with Mikhail (Salnuk) Temryukovich and his cousins Semyon (Uardaschao) and Fedor Zhilegotovich, the Dautokov (Tautokov) brothers served in the oprichnina.
In their homeland, the Kabardian princes and nobles also enjoyed the fruits of the alliance established with Russia. They received a "salary" from the tsar, ran a household, traded on preferential terms, and built rich princely estates.
The alliance with the Russian state, formed in 1557, did not interrupt the line of independent political development of Kabarda and did not limit its independence in solving internal and foreign policy issues. The entry of Kabarda into the union was formalized by an international treaty, the form of which was specially developed in the Ambassadorial Prikaz. The original treaty of 1557 has not survived, only those parts of it that were used in the compilation of the all-Russian chronicle collection have survived to us.
The main formulas for the shert records and letters of gratitude of the Kabardian princes of the 16th-18th centuries contained military-political obligations binding the sovereign parties.
Russia acted in relations with Kabarda as a politically dominant subject: 1) the Kabardian princes swore allegiance to the Moscow sovereign, 2) Kabardian amanats were sent to Russian fortresses to consolidate the oath taken, finally, 3) young people from the Kabardian feudal aristocracy left for Russia, remaining in the Moscow state in the service and losing contact with the Motherland.
But such relations and the corresponding practice did not arise according to the intention of the Russian side. The tradition of asymmetric relations has developed objectively.