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In the evolution of computer ethics there has been an intermittent discussion of the statement that "Computer ethics is unique". The discussion seems to re-emerge with each new change in technology and change in predominant area of interest about the way computers are changing our social institutions. One of the earliest positive definitions of computer ethics was given by James Moor [1985]. In this paper Moor argues that computer ethics is unique by first defining a computer ethics situation as one in which a computer is "essentially involved".This is an example of one difference in CEIU, namely some interpret CEIU to mean "Computers have made an evolutionary change in the ethical landscape and we have to work hard using traditional ethics to remap that landscape", while others interpret CEIU to mean that "Computers have made a revolutionary change in the ethical landscape such that the principles space and time can no longer be used to guide us in traversing the landscape." The evolutionary version of CEIU is about particular ethical decisions, while the revolutionary version is about the methodology of ethical reasoning. This is but one of several variations in CEIU. In this paper, we maintain that: this is not a simple statement, but that it has several quite distinct meanings, 1 of 8 16/2/2002 6:30 ii

TEACHING\CE\cepe file:///E|/users/gouscos/daiadeoocieaeU/Aeaass...he Evolution of the Uniqueness Revolution.htm this assertion has some significant and dangerous consequences, until these meanings of uniqueness are clearly defined, discussions based on CEIU results in inconsistencies and a failure to understand the consequences of this claim, and the revolutionary interpretation of CEIU has not yet been proven. 2 CEIU: traditional responses 2.1 The assertion of CEIU is benign Discussions about the uniqueness of computer ethics is sometimes viewed by philosophers and novice computer ethics scholars as just another benign philosophical discussion. The answer to this question is viewed as simply a part of the definition of computer ethics. Saying computer ethics is unique is almost like giving an ostensive definition. People who have dealt with this question have rarely claimed to be establishing results in the discipline of computer ethics. CEIU's primary use is as a justification for the discipline of computer ethics or the study of these special unique problems. The uniqueness discussion is sometimes viewed as so irrelevant to the progress of the discipline, that the discussants show little interest in how others have approached the question or in testing the correctness or precise meaning of other's claims that computer ethics is unique. This claim is sometimes made to justify the creation of another discipline or academic department, for example, Walter Maner [1995] states, " Computer ethics is unique so its study is justified."Deborah Johnson[1997] recently suggested that several aspects of the Internet have had an impact on the issues within computer ethics She appeals to the pervasive "anonymity" of individuals and "reproducibility" of information in ways not possible without the Internet. Krystyna Gorniak [1996] also appeals to the Internet and argues that there are no good analogies available for cyber-situations. On the surface it may appear that these authors are making similar claims based on the deceptively simple claim "Computer ethics is unique" (Hereafter CEIU).This involvement contributes to the uniqueness of the situation because of the computer's unique properties of "logical malleability" and "speed". He argues that the pervasive alteration of social and cultural situations by this machine has created policy "vacuums" about how to use computer technology which require us to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach to determine how to fill these vacuums.The uniqueness of the way the computer transforms the world will "...require us to go back to the old question: what is ethical". The old ethics has been made irrelevant by the unique nature of the computer revolution. According to Gorniak, we are in an ethical "vacuum" in which the prior ethics (Utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc.) are increasingly irrelevant..For Moor, uniqueness refers to the new situations More recently Krystyna Gorniak, arguing that Moor has not gone far enough [Gorniak 1996] maintains that although there may be an area called computer ethics, it is so unique that traditional ethical concepts do not apply to it and we have to wait for the Newtonian revolution in ethics to develop or discover the concepts that do apply.The presumption that there can be no 2 of 8 16/2/2002 6:30 ii

TEACHING\CE\cepe file:///E|/users/gouscos/daiadeoocieaeU/Aeaass...he Evolution of the Uniqueness Revolution.htm agreement in ethics can be so strong that it corrupts one's view of the evidence.Notice how "uniqueness" has shifted from referring to a socio-cultural phenomena and it now refers to the principles of normative ethics, which are so unique they are yet to be discovered. The answer to the uniqueness question is not insignificant. What is puzzling is that, as we have just seen, the same answer "Yes, computer ethics is unique."Moor's claim for uniqueness leads to a search for usable analogies; Johnson uses traditional norms to derive some general rules for behavior; while Gorniak's claim about cyber-situations means that traditional ethics is not applicable to cyber-situations.He gathered the opinions of people from several professions, ranging from accountants, attorneys, psychologists and philosophy professors to computer professionals.We shall see that there are many meanings to CEIU.

In the evolution of computer ethics there has been an intermittent discussion of the statement that "Computer ethics is unique". The discussion seems to re-emerge with each new change in technology and change in predominant area of interest about the way computers are changing our social institutions. One of the earliest positive definitions of computer ethics was given by James Moor [1985]. In this paper Moor argues that computer ethics is unique by first defining a computer ethics situation as one in which a computer is "essentially involved". This involvement contributes to the uniqueness of the situation because of the computer's unique properties of "logical malleability" and "speed". He argues that the pervasive alteration of social and cultural situations by this machine has created policy "vacuums" about how to use computer technology which require us to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach to determine how to fill these vacuums. From this he concludes that the domain of computer ethics consists of those situations which have been altered and that computer ethics is worthy of study because of its practical importance. The rise of the Internet has led to several new papers on the question. Deborah Johnson[1997] recently suggested that several aspects of the Internet have had an impact on the issues within computer ethics She appeals to the pervasive "anonymity" of individuals and "reproducibility" of information in ways not possible without the Internet. Krystyna Gorniak [1996] also appeals to the Internet and argues that there are no good analogies available for cyber-situations.
On the surface it may appear that these authors are making similar claims based on the deceptively simple claim "Computer ethics is unique" (Hereafter CEIU). We shall see that there are many meanings to CEIU. There are several axis of understanding of CEIU. One way to see the difference is to look at the position that CEIU is used to further. In the papers cited above the authors assume that one approach to ethical reasoning is by analogy. We determine which normative principles to apply and how to judge a new situation based on its similarity to other familiar situations. Moor points to a policy vacuum where we have not yet discovered the analogies to the new situations, while Gorniak talks about the absence of analogies for cyber-situations. From this she concludes traditional ethics, for which we have analogies, which may be difficult to discover, does not apply to cyber-situations. Moor's claim for uniqueness leads to a search for usable analogies; Johnson uses traditional norms to derive some general rules for behavior; while Gorniak's claim about cyber-situations means that traditional ethics is not applicable to cyber-situations. This is an example of one difference in CEIU, namely some interpret CEIU to mean "Computers have made an evolutionary change in the ethical landscape and we have to work hard using traditional ethics to remap that landscape", while others interpret CEIU to mean that "Computers have made a revolutionary change in the ethical landscape such that the principles space and time can no longer be used to guide us in traversing the landscape." The evolutionary version of CEIU is about particular ethical decisions, while the revolutionary version is about the methodology of ethical reasoning.
This is but one of several variations in CEIU. In this paper, we maintain that:
this is not a simple statement, but that it has several quite distinct meanings,
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TEACHING\CE\cepe file:///E|/users/gouscos/ðáíåðéóôçìéáêÜ/Áéãáß...he Evolution of the Uniqueness Revolution.htm
this assertion has some significant and dangerous consequences,
until these meanings of uniqueness are clearly defined, discussions based on CEIU results in inconsistencies and a failure to understand the consequences of this claim, and
the revolutionary interpretation of CEIU has not yet been proven.
2 CEIU: traditional responses
2.1 The assertion of CEIU is benign
Discussions about the uniqueness of computer ethics is sometimes viewed by philosophers and novice computer ethics scholars as just another benign philosophical discussion. The answer to this question is viewed as simply a part of the definition of computer ethics. Saying computer ethics is unique is almost like giving an ostensive definition.
People who have dealt with this question have rarely claimed to be establishing results in the discipline of computer ethics. CEIU's primary use is as a justification for the discipline of computer ethics or the study of these special unique problems. The uniqueness discussion is sometimes viewed as so irrelevant to the progress of the discipline, that the discussants show little interest in how others have approached the question or in testing the correctness or precise meaning of other's claims that computer ethics is unique. This claim is sometimes made to justify the creation of another discipline or academic department, for example, Walter Maner [1995] states, " Computer ethics is unique so its study is justified." As indicated above, the consequences of such a claim, when understood in a revolutionary way, are far from insignificant.
2.2 A framework for understanding
A framework for understanding the various meanings of this assertion will be useful. One way to view the brief history of computer ethics is to order the primary areas of interest of computer ethics. Broadly speaking computer ethicists have addressed subjects of: 1) abuses committed with computers including fraud and theft, 2) the effects computers have on changing society, and 3) ethical issues related to the development of software systems. In the first stage of concern with computer ethics the order of the interests was: abuses, changes to society, and development issues. In the current stage of computer ethics the order of these areas is changed to society characterized by the Internet, abuses done using computers, and software development issues.
Donn Parker was one of the early writers about ethical issues in computing. In his early works Parker used the fact that each answer to short scenarios was unique and that this disagreement proved that the reason computer ethics is not taught in computer science departments is that there is no such subject as computer ethics. It is so unique, it is a non-discipline [Parker 1977]. He used a voting methodology to decide what is ethical in computing. He gathered the opinions of people from several professions, ranging from accountants, attorneys, psychologists and philosophy professors to computer professionals. They were asked to vote on the ethics of individuals described in very short scenarios. He says, this work was not guided by a concept of computer ethics nor was there an attempt to discover ethical principles. He called this approach "micro-ethics." Not only was there an absence of a concept of computer ethics but the primary direction was an emphasis on proscribed activities. The only direction was that the scenarios were " written in such a way as to raise questions of unethicality rather than ethicality [Parker 1977]". Donn Parker used the diversity of opinions expressed about these scenarios to argue that there was no such thing as computer ethics.
Parker's extreme conclusion is not justified for two reasons. First, it does not follow from his own evidence. Second, the evidence examined has little to do with Computer Ethics. The presumption that there can be no
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agreement in ethics can be so strong that it corrupts one's view of the evidence. For example, at a conference, Parker described the results of his 1977 workshop. He began by saying that there was agreement on many scenarios and then went on to say, "We got a lot of very close votes. In other words, we were not able to obtain a consensus on what is unethical and not unethical in the computer field. [Parker 1982]" This conclusion requires that he ignores all the places where there was agreement. It does not follow from the existence of some gray areas in a domain that there are no clear areas in a domain. The existence of hard problems in math - like the discrete decimal value of 1/3 - is not proof that there are no solutions in math. He handles the evidence in the same way in his revision of the 1977 book [Parker 1990]. The only cases he brings forward to the new book are those which generated the highest degree of diversity of opinion. He ignored those on which there had been a significant degree of unanimity.
In the first stage of the concern with computer ethics, James Moor had argued that computer ethics is a viable subject but that the pervasive impact of computing had caused some policy vacuums about the practical use of computers. For Moor, uniqueness refers to the new situations More recently Krystyna Gorniak, arguing that Moor has not gone far enough [Gorniak 1996] maintains that although there may be an area called computer ethics, it is so unique that traditional ethical concepts do not apply to it and we have to wait for the Newtonian revolution in ethics to develop or discover the concepts that do apply. The computer has unique effects on the world "...the more computers will change the world as we know it, the more irrelevant ethical rules will be and the more evident the need of a new ethic. This new ethic will be the computer ethic." The uniqueness of the way the computer transforms the world will "...require us to go back to the old question: what is ethical". The old ethics has been made irrelevant by the unique nature of the computer revolution. According to Gorniak, we are in an ethical "vacuum" in which the prior ethics (Utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc.) are increasingly irrelevant.. Some computer practitioners may appreciate this, since no one can, with good philosophical foundation, say their actions are ethically wrong. Others consider this an ambiguous and ill-founded situation which restricts all of their actions because they want to only do the right thing. Notice how "uniqueness" has shifted from referring to a socio-cultural phenomena and it now refers to the principles of normative ethics, which are so unique they are yet to be discovered.
The answer to the uniqueness question is not insignificant. What is puzzling is that, as we have just seen, the same answer "Yes, computer ethics is unique." can lead to such radically different conclusions about the viability and nature of the subject "computer ethics". There are even those (for example Oz) who have used all the uniqueness variants to promote an inclusive form of computer ethics. How can there be such diverse conclusions drawn from such a simple statement? William James, the great American philosopher, said that many philosophical problems can be solved if we clearly define the question .