Lakhasly

The chapter opened by considering the often repeated realist claim that the pattern of international politics--wars interrupted for periods characterized by the preparation for future wars--have remained constant over the preceding twenty-five centuries.Moreover, rather than identifying the terrorists as transnational criminals and using police enforcement methods to counter their threat, the USA and its allies defined them as enemies of the state who had to be targeted and defeated using conventional military means.Behind the rhetoric of universal values, the USA has used the war to justify a wide range of policy positions that strengthen its economic and military power while undermining various multilateral agreements on arms control, the environment, human rights, and trade.From classical realists such as Rousseau to structural realists such as Waltz, protagonists have argued that interdependence is as likely to breed 'mutual vulnerability' as peace and prosperity.Had one of the significant norms of the Westphalian order become unhinged, namely, that war happens between sovereign states?

The chapter opened by considering the often repeated realist claim that the pattern of
international politics—wars interrupted for periods characterized by the preparation
for future wars—have remained constant over the preceding twenty-five centuries.
Realists have consistently held that the continuities in international relations are
more important than the changes, but many find this to be increasingly problematic
in the present age of globalization. But the importance of Realism has not been
diminished by the dynamics of globalization. It is not clear that economic
interdependence has made war less likely. The state continues to be the dominant
unit in world politics. And globalization should not be seen as a process that is
disconnected from the distribution of power in the international system. In this
sense, this current phase of globalization is fundamentally tied to Westernization
and, to be even more specific, Americanization.
Not surprisingly, leading realist thinkers have been quick to seize on the apparent
convergence between our post- 9/11 experience and the cycle of violence predicted
by the theory. There were, however, some apparent contradictions in the realist
account of the conflict. To begin with, the attacks on the US homeland were
committed by a non-state actor. Had one of the significant norms of the Westphalian
order become unhinged, namely, that war happens between sovereign states? Not
only was the enemy a global network of Al Qaeda operatives, their goal was
unconventional in that they did not seek to conquer territory but challenge by force
the ideological supremacy of the West. Set against these anomalies, the leading
states in the system were quick to identify the network with certain territorial
states—the Taliban government of Afghanistan being the most immediate example,
but also other pariah states who allegedly harboured terrorists. The United States
was quick to link the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq with its global war on
terror. Moreover, rather than identifying the terrorists as transnational criminals
and using police enforcement methods to counter their threat, the USA and its allies
defined them as enemies of the state who had to be targeted and defeated using
conventional military means.
For realists such as John Gray and Kenneth Waltz, 9/11 was not the beginning of a
new era in world politics so much as a case of ‘business as usual’ (see their essays in
Booth and Dunne 2002). What matters most, argues Waltz, are the continuities in the
structural imbalance of power in the system and the distribution of nuclear weapons.
Crises are to be expected because the logic of self-help generates periodic crises.
Their analysis is a stark rejoinder to the more idealist defenders of globalization who
see a new pacific world order emerging out of the ashes of the previous order.
According to realists, 9/11 was never going to trigger a new era in governance: the
coalition of the willing that was forged in the immediate aftermath was, in Waltz’s
terms, ‘a mile wide’, but only ‘an inch deep’. How prophetic those words have
proven to be. The war against Iraq was executed by the USA with the UK being the
only significant diplomatic and military ally. Not only did most states in the world
oppose the war, leading American realists were public in their condemnation (see
Box 5.2). Iraq, they argued, could have been deterred from threatening both the
security of the United States and its neighbours in the Middle East. Furthermore, a
costly military intervention followed by a lengthy occupation in the Middle East has
weakened the USA’s ability to contain the rising threat from China. In short, the
Bush Presidency has not exercised power in a responsible and sensible manner.
Behind the rhetoric of universal values, the USA has used the war to justify a wide
range of policy positions that strengthen its economic and military power while
undermining various multilateral agreements on arms control, the environment,
human rights, and trade.
Realists do not have to situate their theory of world politics in opposition to
globalization per se; rather, what they offer is a very different conceptualization of
the process. What is important about a realist view of globalization is the claim that
rudimentary transnational governance is possible but at the same time it is entirely
dependent on the distribution of power. Given the preponderance of power that the
USA holds, it should not be a surprise that it has been one of the foremost
proponents of globalization. The core values of globalization—liberalism,
capitalism, and consumerism—are exactly those espoused by the United States. At a
deeper cultural level, realists argue that modernity is not, as liberals hope, dissolving
the boundaries of difference among the peoples of the world. From classical realists
such as Rousseau to structural realists such as Waltz, protagonists have argued that
interdependence is as likely to breed ‘mutual vulnerability’ as peace and prosperity.
And while questioning the extent to which the world has become any more
interdependent in relative terms, realists insist that the state is not going to be
eclipsed by global forces operating either below or above the nation-state.
Nationalism, realists have continuously reminded us, remains a potent force in world
politics