Lakhasly

Conclusion: organising project cultures for achieving cooperation

The case studies suggest that managerial rationalities are limited in understanding their own complex project reali- ties which are themselves bound by limits imposed by over- all governance structures and strategies.We would agree and contend that instead of seeing the budget overruns, inflated forecasts, costs and public benefit as occurring by malevolent design, we should see them as the result of normal practice of professionals operating with limited knowledge, but influenced dramatically by a range of ambiguous and uncertain external and internal forces.Flyvbjerg et al.'s [2] view is essentially one that takes a functional, external view on the projects, identifying a par- adox of the increasing, yet counterintuitive, popularity of these projects even though their record is poor on perfor- mance, budget and on-time delivery.He accuses the meg- aprojects of lacking in accountability, yet acknowledges that 'rarely is there a simple truth about such projects' and that 'what is presented as a reality by one set of experts is often a social construct that can be reconstructed and deconstructed by another set of experts' [2].In Environ the inability to do this led to a break down in culture and polit- ical relations the upshot of which was that self-interest never became defined in terms of any overarching good but became an organising device for regression to the norm of highly-conflictual project relations.By considering long-established traditions in organisation and management theory, including the nat- ure of practical rationality, plus differing organisational interests, values and project orientations or cultures, we obtain a real, rather than an idealised view, of what takes place.Internally, the NSTP solved the problems that Flyvbjerg and his colleagues [2] attribute to malfeasance through the marriage of internal democracy among the partners with a strict regime of accountability that was both non-zero sum and served the self-interest of the players.Due to its tight connection with par- ents and partners, the environment became an inverse mir- ror of the project team's successful self-image and when foreign elements in that environment, who came from out- side the project reality as it was being co-constructed, mobilised around the venting issue, they caught the team off guard because its members were so strongly committed to the rhetoric of their culture.It was fundamental aspects of organisational and project design and the politics of decision-making rather than a conspiracy between project partners, government and financial institutions that produced a less than optimal result and one that differed markedly from that projected at the outset.In this way, megaprojects with their complexity can be seen as the norm, rather than being condemned because they do not match an ideal where project objec- tives are achieved faultlessly and effortlessly.That is the key mes- sage of our research.

Conclusion: organising project cultures for achieving cooperation

The case studies suggest that managerial rationalities are limited in understanding their own complex project reali- ties which are themselves bound by limits imposed by over- all governance structures and strategies. In Environ, complexity was reduced to such a level that project defini- tions within the project team prevented the group members from connecting with their external project partners. The environment became a hostile entity, resulting in distrust and a lack of information distribution between the team and external partners.
Ironically, the NSTP project faced an almost inverse form of complexity. Due to its tight connection with par- ents and partners, the environment became an inverse mir- ror of the project team’s successful self-image and when foreign elements in that environment, who came from out- side the project reality as it was being co-constructed, mobilised around the venting issue, they caught the team off guard because its members were so strongly committed to the rhetoric of their culture.
There are fundamental project design implications to be drawn from the two cases. In the Environ case, power relations, and the lack of balance between players, sabo- taged the project design and prevented an appropriate,
functional or overt, project culture, from emerging. By contrast, in the NSTP, the power relations were well- thought out beforehand through governance mechanisms, and the overall incentive role played by the relationship between the KPIs and the risk/reward scheme. The risk of the project being sabotaged came not from the partners’ political machinations but from self-induced political blind spots, in terms of their role in empowering communities without providing an arena in which this power could be allied with responsibility.
Internally, the NSTP solved the problems that Flyvbjerg and his colleagues [2] attribute to malfeasance through the marriage of internal democracy among the partners with a strict regime of accountability that was both non-zero sum and served the self-interest of the players. In Environ the inability to do this led to a break down in culture and polit- ical relations the upshot of which was that self-interest never became defined in terms of any overarching good but became an organising device for regression to the norm of highly-conflictual project relations.
These findings criticise the top-down conception that still dominates academic debate on project management. These concepts perceive project organisations situated in a social environment in which work-related goals and activities are clear and can be predicted. In such a concep- tion there are no internal conflicts which hinder the project and complexity is located in the domain of policy formula- tion. The findings of the two megaprojects support the need include issues of power, ambiguity, and paradoxes for studying project management and contribute to the emerge of a critical theory on project management as suggested by Hodgson and Cicmil [37].
Even thought the results of Environ, with time and bud- get slippage, might seem to suggest to an outsider that there was a conspiracy against the public interest, seen from the inside, our findings are more mundane and show that what managers were doing, reflects regular practice. It was fundamental aspects of organisational and project design and the politics of decision-making rather than a conspiracy between project partners, government and financial institutions that produced a less than optimal result and one that differed markedly from that projected at the outset. No basis for collective interest was evidenced in the project and if anything, it was the absence of any such collective interest that sabotaged the project.
Flyvbjerg et al.’s [2] view is essentially one that takes a functional, external view on the projects, identifying a par- adox of the increasing, yet counterintuitive, popularity of these projects even though their record is poor on perfor- mance, budget and on-time delivery. He accuses the meg- aprojects of lacking in accountability, yet acknowledges that ‘rarely is there a simple truth about such projects’ and that ‘what is presented as a reality by one set of experts is often a social construct that can be reconstructed and deconstructed by another set of experts’ [2].
We would agree and contend that instead of seeing the budget overruns, inflated forecasts, costs and public benefit
as occurring by malevolent design, we should see them as the result of normal practice of professionals operating with limited knowledge, but influenced dramatically by a range of ambiguous and uncertain external and internal forces. Amongst these, project design and project cultures and rationalities play a central role in influencing successful cooperation between partners.
We argue it is necessary therefore to take an emic or internally-focused, contextually-grounded view of actual practice rather than an etic or outsider’s, preordained view of megaprojects. By considering long-established traditions in organisation and management theory, including the nat- ure of practical rationality, plus differing organisational interests, values and project orientations or cultures, we obtain a real, rather than an idealised view, of what takes place. In this way, megaprojects with their complexity can be seen as the norm, rather than being condemned because they do not match an ideal where project objec- tives are achieved faultlessly and effortlessly. An ideal set of circumstances and outcomes, which differ too drastically from everyday practice, will always produce gaps for anal- ysis. It is not so much that these gaps need filling by post hoc moral outrage but rather that the practical rationalities and practices of the players whose projects are at stake, need to be considered and analysed in the context of their project designs and project cultures. That is the key mes- sage of our research.