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3 The Variety of Answers
The variety of interpretations of the uniqueness claim can be approached from several directions. We present
the views of several authorities in compute ethics. We consider their starting positions, the resultant
perspectives that they adopt and use these to identify the overall view of computer ethics each of them
promotes.
In 1985, Deborah Johnson considered computer ethics to be a study into the way in which computers pose
new versions of standard moral problems and moral dilemmas that resulted in having to apply moral norms in
new situations. Her stance allows little room for the concept of computer ethics uniqueness. This stance is
modified in the second edition of her book [1994] in that more emphasis is put on computer ethics being
concerned with new species of problems. This evolution of stance continues in her work with Keith Miller
[1996].
Johnson and Miller explain that computing has fundamentally changed who we are as individuals, communities
and nations and that computing has challenged and modified social culture, laws, economics and politics. They
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explain that computer ethics is about working on something new whilst drawing on something old. Significantly
they state that most computing issues can be understood using traditional moral concepts but there are special
features that make a moral difference. The implication is that if most are covered, have analogies with standard
ethical issues, some must not be covered and these therefore are unique. They also recognize that the issues
are significant in their own right and are thus arguing for the existence of a type of uniqueness. In addition to
the way computers transform some social issues, they explain that issues arise in unique ways that computer
professionals must address in the course of their work. It is clear that the genus-species argument has thus
evolved to recognize there is a kind of uniqueness in computer ethics and that there is some recognition it is
multifaceted.
Moor[1985] advocates that the field is concerned with policy vacuums and conceptual muddles regarding the
social and ethical use of computing. Moor appears to be suggesting that there is the possibility of new situations
but does not advocate abandoning existing theories to address these new situations which is the possible
course of action that Gorniak [1996] proposes. Moor also implies that addressing these issues will require an
amalgam of disciplines.
Oz [1994] claims that it is the speed of change which has left a big ethical vacuum and this has meant it is
difficult to address issues of misuse that inevitably follow the advent of this universal tool [Moor 1985]. Oz
describes three categories of misuse requiring ethical consideration:offences that existed before the advent of
computers but were facilitated by computers, offences against computers, computer equipment and software,
and the invasion of privacy. The first of these is the genus-species concept, the second includes offences that
did not exist before the advent of computers such as the destruction of computer files and the illegal copying of
software, and the final one is a specific fundamental human right. Oz is unique in that all of the varieties of the
uniqueness claim are maintained simultaneously.
Maner [1990] started to define an area of study that could be labelled computer ethics. In a later paper,
Maner [1996] advocates that computer ethics examines the ethical problems aggravated , transformed or
created by computing and that the "Lack of an effective analogy forces us to discover new moral values,
formulate new moral principles, develop new policies, and find new ways to think ...". Maner makes a clear
statement of uniqueness in the definition of computer ethics.
Bynum [1993] advocates that computer ethics is concerned with how to integrate computing and human values
in such a way that computing advances and protects human values rather than harms them. It is probably the
broadest perspective and embraces applied ethics, sociology of computing, technology assessment, computer
law and other related fields. Such an approach appears to place computer ethics as an "umbrella" discipline
unique in its holistic form but not when decomposed.
Huff and Finholt[1994] adopt a different stance. They focus on the computer professional, suggesting there are
three areas of commitment in the search for excellence: commitment to designing and implementing a quality
product, awareness of ethical issues in design and implementation, and concern about the social context that
influences the use of computing. This appears to be an approach of practical usefulness recognizing that the
field requires some special attention given its special characteristics. This approach is similar to the work of
Gotterbarn [1992] in this area who is concerned with the way in which computer professionals undertake their
work so that the outcomes of their endeavors are socially and ethically acceptable.
Anderson [1994] suggests that computer ethics applies not just to computer professionals but to all who use
computers or come into contact with their inputs and outputs which means every one living in industrialized
societies. It is this, the last part of his definition, that restricts the focus in a potentially dangerous manner as it
does not take into account the needs or impacts on the world at large simply focusing attention on the industrial
society.
Spinello [1995] explains that any technology tends to create a new human environment and never more so
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than computing. He is concerned that this new environment does not violate personal rights or the values of
fairness and justice. He insists on the inclusion of all stakeholder considerations when deciding upon
technological issues and appears to advocate a Rawlsian approach.
Miller provides some interesting input to the computer ethics debate [Collins and Miller 1992, Collins, Miller et
al 1994]. He suggests that software is different from other manufactured products and thus raises different and
difficult ethical issues. He further suggests that such issues can be addressed in a rational and systematic
manner and advocates a method for ethical decision making that is computing-specific. Without doubt there is
an implicit uniqueness claim in these suggestions.

It can be seen from this brief review that there are many views of what computer ethics comprises. This
richness of opinion is probably due to a difference in perception of computing characteristics, the adopted
focus - broadly split between the outcome/symptom of computing or the undertaking of computing, and the
disciplinary background. Starting points are certainly different and include the properties of computer
technology, the concept of computing, the application of computing and the human value impact of computing.
The perspectives can be analyzed using several sub categories:

social - considering the computing-impact on society
professional - considering the manner of professional activity
universal activist - inclusive of communities around the globe
parochial - restricted consideration of current and future issues
ethics only - drawing only from ethics theory
multi-disciplinary - blending theory from several discipline