Lakhasly

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MORAL MAN As we already pointed out earlier, prior to reason, man was character- ized by the two sentiments of self-love and pity for other sentient beings.Rousseau seems to be implying here 'a natural and painless transition from the study of Nature to the search for its author; and when the idea of God is acquired, as the most reasonable explanation of the cosmos, it follows that with the natural love of self, there will be associated a natural love of the Creator of the self and the universal order, of which the self feels itself to be an inte- gral part...[then is born] an active conscience which, although it operates through feeling, does not supplant reason, but supplements it.'13 As a moral being, Emile now has a conscience, which, for Rousseau, is based both on the sentiments and on reason.In Emile in 1762, Rousseau, writes that, 'Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man.'11 A little later, he laments that, 'All our wisdom consists in servile prejudices, all our customs are but servitude, worry and constraint.'Emile is not a primitive, but an artificially-produced natu- ral man for an artificially-produced natural society.'14 Just as Emile is for a certain kind of education completing or perfecting our nature, similarly, is not The Social Contract about the rightly organized political society building on what nature already provides us with?As an adolescent, Emile naturally experiences a sexual urge which the tutor is to sublimate into 'friendship and the general sense of human community', by using the natural sentiment or pre-rational nat- ural instinct of compassion.Civilized man is born, lives and dies in a state of slavery...and as long as he preserves the human form, he is fettered by our institutions.'12 Emile, interestingly enough, is a treatise on education.Since,

            Rousseau (1712-1778) 151

Box 8.4 on the social contract and the creation of the body politic: "The problem is to find a form of asso- ciation which will defend and protect with the whole common force the per- son and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before."By this time, Rousseau had come to the conclusion that education, organized along the right lines, would build on the strengths of our human nature instead of perverting it. Therefore, he advocates the education of Emile, in the countryside; close to nature, and away from the city.The tutor ensures that the child has the freedom to move about freely in this natural and solitary environ- ment, and keeps him away from any books till the age of 12.Rousseau defined freedom thus: 'Obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty.'15 Which kind of society, however, will establish such freedom?Society, characterized by inequality, becomes responsible not only for the corruption of human

            beings, but also for the lack of liberty in their lives.It is due to these views of Rousseau, that he is often associated with the slogan 'Back to Nature'.The early Rousseau, of the two discourses, seems to give us an extremely negative judgement on society and civilization.Is this judgement reit- erated in Emile?During this time Emile is also to learn some basic manual skill or a useful art, like carpentry.As a created natural order, nature has purposes or ends imbued in it, and with this realization, Emile comes to know himself as a moral being.Rousseau (1712-1778) 149

            150 Chapter 8

It is at the end of this stage, by about the early twenties, that Emile learns that the order of which he is part, is also a social order, and that he has grown up not merely to be a man, but also a citizen.The individualism of Emile does not imply that men in general can find personal fulfilment outside society.Emile is a child who is removed from his parents and sent away, with a tutor, to the countryside.Between 12 and 15, the only book Emile is to be allowed access to, is Robinson Crusoe.It is only when the boy has turned 15, that the tutor introduces him to the study of philosophy and religion.From play- ing in the lap of nature, when the student turns to metaphysics and religion, he acquires a sense of being part of the natural order.Rousseau seems to suggest that human beings need to come together in society to achieve a better life, but he is also makes it clear that this society has to be organized on certain lines.However, if Rousseau really had this contempt for human learning, then why would he write a work on education?Rousseau thinks that the child should learn to reason for himself, on the basis of his experience and not because of what he learns from books.This moral sense can only be born in society, and we need to establish a society in which, not only do we pre- serve the liberty of the state of nature, but also provide the conditions for us to achieve moral freedom.In place of a society in which a few rule over the many, human beings need to set up a society guaranteeing civil and moral freedom for all.These pure emotions are corrupted in society.In the state of nature, not only do we have free will, we also enjoy natural liberty, since 'no man has a natural authority over his fellow in the state of nature'.However, we have no moral liberty in the state of nature, because we have not yet developed a moral sense.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MORAL MAN
As we already pointed out earlier, prior to reason, man was character- ized by the two sentiments of self-love and pity for other sentient beings. These pure emotions are corrupted in society. Society, characterized by inequality, becomes responsible not only for the corruption of human

            beings, but also for the lack of liberty in their lives. It is due to these views of Rousseau, that he is often associated with the slogan ‘Back to Nature’. The early Rousseau, of the two discourses, seems to give us an extremely negative judgement on society and civilization. Is this judgement reit- erated in Emile? In Emile in 1762, Rousseau, writes that, ‘Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man.’11 A little later, he laments that, ‘All our wisdom consists in servile prejudices, all our customs are but servitude, worry and constraint. Civilized man is born, lives and dies in a state of slavery...and as long as he preserves the human form, he is fettered by our institutions.’12

Emile, interestingly enough, is a treatise on education. However, if Rousseau really had this contempt for human learning, then why would he write a work on education? By this time, Rousseau had come to the conclusion that education, organized along the right lines, would build on the strengths of our human nature instead of perverting it. Therefore, he advocates the education of Emile, in the countryside; close to nature, and away from the city. Emile is a child who is removed from his parents and sent away, with a tutor, to the countryside. The tutor ensures that the child has the freedom to move about freely in this natural and solitary environ- ment, and keeps him away from any books till the age of 12. Rousseau thinks that the child should learn to reason for himself, on the basis of his experience and not because of what he learns from books. Between 12 and 15, the only book Emile is to be allowed access to, is Robinson Crusoe. During this time Emile is also to learn some basic manual skill or a useful art, like carpentry. As an adolescent, Emile naturally experiences a sexual urge which the tutor is to sublimate into ‘friendship and the general sense of human community’, by using the natural sentiment or pre-rational nat- ural instinct of compassion. It is only when the boy has turned 15, that the tutor introduces him to the study of philosophy and religion. From play- ing in the lap of nature, when the student turns to metaphysics and religion, he acquires a sense of being part of the natural order. As a created natural order, nature has purposes or ends imbued in it, and with this realization, Emile comes to know himself as a moral being. Rousseau seems to be implying here ‘a natural and painless transition from the study of Nature to the search for its author; and when the idea of God is acquired, as the most reasonable explanation of the cosmos, it follows that with the natural love of self, there will be associated a natural love of the Creator of the self and the universal order, of which the self feels itself to be an inte- gral part...[then is born] an active conscience which, although it operates through feeling, does not supplant reason, but supplements it.’13 As a moral being, Emile now has a conscience, which, for Rousseau, is based both on the sentiments and on reason.
Rousseau (1712–1778) 149

            150 Chapter 8

It is at the end of this stage, by about the early twenties, that Emile learns that the order of which he is part, is also a social order, and that he has grown up not merely to be a man, but also a citizen. The individualism of Emile does not imply that men in general can find personal fulfilment outside society. ‘Emile is not a primitive, but an artificially-produced natu- ral man for an artificially-produced natural society.’14
Just as Emile is for a certain kind of education completing or perfecting our nature, similarly, is not The Social Contract about the rightly organized political society building on what nature already provides us with? In the state of nature, not only do we have free will, we also enjoy natural liberty, since ‘no man has a natural authority over his fellow in the state of nature’. However, we have no moral liberty in the state of nature, because we have not yet developed a moral sense. This moral sense can only be born in society, and we need to establish a society in which, not only do we pre- serve the liberty of the state of nature, but also provide the conditions for us to achieve moral freedom. In place of a society in which a few rule over the many, human beings need to set up a society guaranteeing civil and moral freedom for all. Rousseau defined freedom thus: ‘Obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty.’15 Which kind of society, however, will establish such freedom?
Rousseau seems to suggest that human beings need to come together in society to achieve a better life, but he is also makes it clear that this society has to be organized on certain lines. As he puts it, ‘The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.’16 Rousseau’s solution to this problem is a social contract (see Box 8.4), which states that ‘each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole’.17
‘At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a corporate and collective body....This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons,...now takes [the name] of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members “State” when passive, “Sovereign” when active, and “Power” when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sover- eign authority, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State.’18
In simpler terms, Rousseau’s idea is to vest sovereignty with all the people signing the hypothetical contract, so that the same people are both the sovereign as well as the subjects. It is the people who collectively make the laws, and it is the same people who then obey these laws. Since,

            Rousseau (1712–1778) 151

Box 8.4
on the social contract and the creation of the body politic:
“The problem is to find a form of asso- ciation which will defend and protect with the whole common force the per- son and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.” This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the solution. The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that, although they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere thesameandeverywheretacitlyadmit- ted and recognized, until, on the violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the con- ventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it.
These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one—the total alien- ation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the first place, as each gives him- self absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them bur- densome to others.
Moreover, the alienation being with- out reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything more to demand: for, if the individuals retained certain rights, as there would be no common superior to decide between them and the public, each, being on one point his own judge, would ask to be so on all; the state of
nature would thus continue, and the association would necessarily become inoperative or tyrannical.
Finally, each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has.
If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the fol- lowing terms:
Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direc­ tion of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly con- tains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union of all other per- sons, formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive, Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State.
The Social Contract
according to Rousseau liberty is living according to self-prescribed rules, in civil society all the people are free, because they live as subjects under laws which they have framed themselves.
If we establish a society following these steps, we replace the natural liberty of the state of nature, with civil and moral liberty. These two kinds

            152 Chapter 8

of liberty can only exist if sovereignty in civil society is vested, not simply in the people, but more specifically, in the general will of the people. Therefore, we now have to examine what one means by the term ‘general will’.