Lakhasly

Historical Developments The earliest attempts to establish a popular press in what is now Syria had to contend with the highly restrictive laws of the Ottoman Empire.It also included provisions protecting freedom of speech and the right to access public information (Article 3), as well as eliminating prior censorship of content "if the media does not fail its responsibilities" (Article 6). Under the law, the Ministry of Information is responsible for evaluating applications, issuing and revoking licenses to private media organizations, monitoring the operations of media outlets, and issuing accreditation and press credentials to non-Syrian journalists who wish to operate in the country (Article 22). The law, however, keeps in place the broad restrictions on content that "harms national unity," "incites sectarian or confessional strife," and "harms state symbols," and all unauthorized content on the armed forces (Article 12).The frst comprises regions that have remained under the control of the central government (in particular, the coastal regions of Latakia and Tartus, the cities of Homs and Hama, and the capital Damascus) refect, more or less, a continuation of the authoritarian logics of the Syrian regime from pre-2011 with only limited attempts at upgrading and reforming the system.In northeastern Syria, Kurdish forces, led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), established a de factoautonomous region--Rojava--with its own largely independent institutional and regulatory frameworks and media, which comprises the third media environment.

Historical Developments
The earliest attempts to establish a popular press in what is now Syria had to contend with the highly restrictive laws of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, since the earliest recorded paper Al-Shahba, published by Hashem El-Attar and Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi in Aleppo in 1877, the 91 diferent publications that emerged under the Ottomans were subject to “suspension, confscation, or seizure” according to Dajani and Najjar (2003, p. 303). This highly restricted environment ended with the demise of the Ottoman Empire following its defeat in World War I. The new political horizon of Arab nationalism in ascendance since before the war, was refected in the popular press in the tumultuous period of self-governance from 1918 until 1920 when France took over as the colonial hegemon in Syria and Lebanon. During the period of the French Mandate, press regulation came under the direct authority of the ofce of the French High Commissioner of the Levant. The period also witnessed the emergence of strong journalistic fgures who commanded a nationwide audience. For instance, Najib Al-Rayyes, the so-called dean of Syrian journalism, was a nationalist writer and newspaper publisher, and his paper, Al-Qabas, enjoyed wide readership because of its support of Syrian independence. Other important publications included the nationalist daily Al-Ayyam, published by Najib Al-Armanazi, and the satirical weekly Al-Mudhik Al-Mubki, published by Habib Kahaleh (Rafai, 1969). Moreover, the antecedent to Syrian radio was established in 1941 by the French authorities with 15 employees and used short- and medium-wave transmission. In 1945, the radio stopped broadcasting after its Syrian stafresigned in protest of French policies in the country. It returned to the air on Independence Day, 17 April 1946, and became a full-fedged state broadcaster.
The period immediately following independence was marked by political instability with power changing hands between civilian and military regimes. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war resulted in the arrival of over 80,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria (Said, 2003). The war also saw a series of military setbacks for the newly formed Syrian Army for which the ofcers held the politicians responsible. The social and political tensions in the aftermath of the confict heralded a succession of military coups (1949–1954), which resulted in several highly restrictive press laws. From 1954–1958, parliamentary democracy was restored and, with it, the more liberal Press Law of 1949. These so-called democratic years ushered in a golden age of journalism in the country. Public and private dailies, weeklies, and specialized periodicals proliferated with a minimal censorship regime and a politically competitive environment (Martin, 2015; Rugh, 2004). The major breaking point in the history of Syrian media came with the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party coup d’étaton 8 March 1963. One of the frst steps taken by the new revolutionary leadership on that day was to ban all but three (Ba’ath-afliated) newspapers, Al-Ba’ath, Al-Wahda, and Barada. Legislative decree No. 48 in 1963 took further steps by centralizing all legal publishing in one state-owned organization, the Al-Wahda Foundation for Printing and Publishing (Dajani & Najjar, 2003).
In 1965, the Journalism Syndicate was brought under the government’s authority. By the end of that year, only two national and three regional dailies, and a handful of local periodicals, were left, all of which were published by the state or Ba’ath Party organs. The 1963 coup ushered in an era of “mobilization press” where the media’s main function was the promotion of the regime’s interests and the mobilization of public support (Rugh, 2004). The Ba’ath Party instilled a socialist planned economy that promoted nationalization and state ownership and control of most of its sectors. It established a de factostate monopoly of all media organs, including the press, publishing and distribution, radio, television, and audiovisual production sectors that remained largely undisturbed until the late 1990s. Furthermore, from 1962 onward, following a failed coup attempt by Nasserists, Syria was placed under the provisions of emergency law (partially modifed in the mid-2000s and ofcially lifted in 2011), which gave broad discretion to the executive authority and allowed it to bypass the constitution. The regime of Hafez Al-Assad invested heavily in state media and towards perpetuating a strong cult of personality revolving around Assad and his immediate family (Wedeen, 1999).
The tenets of the Ba’ath Party’s dominance of the economy were severely challenged by the economic crisis of the late 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the US as the global hegemon. These developments pushed the regime to take some tentative steps towards economic liberalization (inftah) culminating in Law No. 10 of 1991, which opened some sectors of the economy to private investment. In the media sector, this was only realized in the feld of audiovisual production where private investment, starting in 1988, initiated a signifcant development of the television drama (musalsalat) industry(Blecher, 2002. The death of Hafez Al-Assad in 2000 and the succession of his son Bashar Al-Assad brought a reinvigoration of economic liberalization processes. The process of authoritarian upgrading under the regime of 24 Arab Media Systems Bashar Al-Assad included a considerable opening of Syria’s economy to world markets, privatization of state assets, gradual withdrawal of state subsidies, shrinking of the public sector, and the growth of a new class of businessmen loyal to the regime. Steps were also taken towards limited easing of restrictions on freedom of expression, but very little in respect to structural political reform (Hinnebusch, 2012). In 2001, the government adopted a new publications law that, while still very restrictive, opened the door for private ownership of print media. Al-Domari, a satirical newspaper, was one of the frst to be established under the new law in February 2001. However, persistent government censorship and economic pressures led to its closure in 2003. Many of the licenses for private media went to Al-Assad crony businessmen, such as Rami Makhlouf, Mayzar Nizam Al-Din, and Majd Suleiman. The Internet also emerged as an important medium during the early 2000s. Syrian news websites, many of which were also owned by crony businessmen, were notable for providing a more open space for the discussion of Syrian politics than what was available in traditional media (De Angelis, 2011; Brownlee, 2020).
The political and territorial fragmentation brought about by the Syrian confict since 2011 is refected in the fragmented Syrian media environment. This fragmentation has led to the development of parallel political economies within the country, in which radically diferent media exist. In particular, we can discern three separate media environments. The frst comprises regions that have remained under the control of the central government (in particular, the coastal regions of Latakia and Tartus, the cities of Homs and Hama, and the capital Damascus) refect, more or less, a continuation of the authoritarian logics of the Syrian regime from pre-2011 with only limited attempts at upgrading and reforming the system. A second separate media environment emerged in the regions that came under the control of rebel groups characterized by the proliferation of completely new small- and medium-sized media initiatives, most of which were later to follow the Syrian exodus to neighboring countries (Turkey and Lebanon) or further afeld to Europe where they have been operating as exilicmedia. In northeastern Syria, Kurdish forces, led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), established a de factoautonomous region—Rojava—with its own largely independent institutional and regulatory frameworks and media, which comprises the third media environment.
Starting in 2011, the Syrian regime initiated several legal and constitutional reforms in an attempt to placate the protest movement. These reforms included abolishing Article 8 of the constitution which granted the Ba’ath Party a guaranteed leadership role in the Syrian government, as well as abolishing presidential plebiscites in favor of elections with multiple candidates. These legal and constitutional changes, however, did not fundamentally alter the de factopolitical system in the country, nor address the existing power bases of the regime in the state security agencies. The presidential election of 2014, dismissed as a sham, resulted in the reelection of Bashar Al-Assad to a new term of seven years with a plurality of 88.7% of the vote in a contest against two largely unknown candidates. As for the media, the most important legislative change came with Decree No. 108 of 2011, which replaced preceding legislation as the regulatory framework governing the media sector. The law introduced several liberalizing provisions, including articles banning monopolies in the media sector and facilitating and regulating private investment in news agencies and broadcast, print, and Internet-based media (Article 35). It also included provisions protecting freedom of speech and the right to access public information (Article 3), as well as eliminating prior censorship of content “if the media does not fail its responsibilities” (Article 6). Under the law, the Ministry of Information is responsible for evaluating applications, issuing and revoking licenses to private media organizations, monitoring the operations of media outlets, and issuing accreditation and press credentials to non-Syrian journalists who wish to operate in the country (Article 22). The law, however, keeps in place the broad restrictions on content that “harms national unity,” “incites sectarian or confessional strife,” and “harms state symbols,” and all unauthorized content on the armed forces (Article 12). Notwithstanding their more liberal leanings, these provisions are rarely applied in practice, especially articles relating to freedom of expression, access to information, and protection of journalists.
Access to information is still subject to the whims of regime ofcials and to broad restrictions on the basis of national security. Control and intimidation of journalists persists through an arbitrary and broad interpretation of Article 12 and the extant penal code, which criminalizes defamation of the president, the courts, and the military, as well as through extralegal means.2 In addition, while the state of emergency, in place since 1962, was ofcially rescinded with Legislative Decree No. 161 of 2011, many of the provisions allowing arbitrary detention were reincorporated in the Counterterrorism Laws of 2012. For example, provisions of this new law were used to prosecute journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders, such as Mazen Darwish and Hussein Ghrer who were charged with “publicizing terrorist acts” and “promoting terrorist activities.”Institutionally, the domestic broadcasting sector remains dominated by the state broadcaster: The Organization of Syrian Arab Radio and Television (ORTAS) that is an entirely state-owned entity and accountable directly to the Council of Ministers. The television section of the entity is responsible for three terrestrial and fve satellite channels. The satellite oferings include channels dedicated to news, entertainment, and television dramas, as well as a newly launched religious channel aimed at promoting the regime’s narrative within Syrian conservative circles. The radio broadcasts are carried on seven dedicated channels, including broadcasts over FM, AM, online, and satellite radio.
As previously noted, the collapse of the regime’s territorial control during the Syrian confict has also provided spaces for new actors to emerge within the media environment. The northeastern regions of Syria, with substantive Kurdish populations, fell from direct regime control in 2012. The area—encompassing parts of the governorates of Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Aleppo, and the whole of Hasakah—has remained relatively stable and been spared the mass destruction seen in other areas that fell from government control. Media activity within the region is regulated by the Information Law of 2015 which was passed by the autonomous administration’s government. The law contains provisions to guarantee freedom of expression and the right to establish media organizations. The law also has a general provision guaranteeing access to public information with exceptions for national security and On the other hand, the emergence of relatively more independent ew spaces within the oppositional media sphere created novel opportunities and avenues for a new generation of Syrian journalists, artists, and media makers to establish themselves. These new actors were able to beneft from generous funding for professional and technical skill building, especially in the early years of the Syrian confict, as well as from the global interest in the Syrian confict. This is most evident in felds such as independent flm production. For example, a number of new Syrian flmmakers have emerged who have accrued critical acclaim for their work. Indeed, several Syrian-directed documentary flms have been nominated for Academy Awards in recent years.3Furthermore, several independent production houses and flm collectives, such as Bidayyat and Abounaddara, have been established since 2011 (Wessels, 2019).
Another notable development was the opposition-afliated media activists and collectives that sprang up early on in the protest movement in an attempt to circumvent the regime’s control over the media sphere. Their work during the early years of the confict was instrumental in providing a diferent narrative of the events to that of the regime’s ofcial version, especially because foreign journalists were not allowed access to the country (Halasa, Omareen & Mahfoud, 2014). As the confict grew more protracted, and more areas fell out of regime control, the early media activism eforts began to coalesce into new media outlets, providing a diferent narrative to that of the regime-afliated media. This development was further empoweredby the infux of foreign media development funding and support channeled to these actors from Western and regional governments and agencies (Della Ratta, 2018). In 2014, there were more than 93 Syrian media outlets operating inside opposition-controlled areas, not counting the ofcial media of oppositional military and political groups. This new sphere of media was unifed only by its staunch anti-regime orientation and was otherwise extremely heterogeneous in terms of ideology (from Islamist to staunchly secular leftist) and covered a variety of media, including broadcast and online radio stations, print and online news journals, magazines, and web-based news agencies (Badran & Smets, 2018).
As the confict conditions inside Syria worsened, a process of consolidation and relocation commenced. Most of these media outlets had to move their core editorial and administrative operations to neighboring countries (in particular Turkey), while retaining a network of reporters inside the country. Since 2016, the structural conditions within which these media outlets must operate have become increasingly more difcult, in particular with regard to the Turkish policies towards Syrians in the country and the shifting priorities in donors’ funding. Thus, only the most consolidated of these initiatives remain today. An example of these new media initiatives is Enab Baladi, which started in 2011 as a small pamphlet in the town of Darayya, south of Damascus, and has become a major news website and print weekly. Within this sphere of oppositional media, we can also include Syria TV, which was established in 2018 in Istanbul and is managed and run by Syrian media professionals who defected from regime control. The television station is part of the Qatar-based Fadaat Media Group, which manages other Syrian and regional media outlets such as Zaman Al-Wasl and The New Arab. Another important broadcaster is Orient News TVwhich is based in Dubai and owned by Syrian businessman Ghassan Aboud. There have also been several attempts to develop sector-wide institutions within this media sphere in an attempt to create a credible alternative to the regime-controlled media ecosystem. For example, the Syrian Journalists Association, based in Paris, was established as an independent professional journalists’ union with the aim of ofering an alternative body to the regime-controlled Syrian Journalists Union It is now a recognized associate member of the International Federation of Journalists.
Economy and Ownership Patterns
In the areas controlled by the central government, licensing for private media (broadcast and print) remains at the discretion of the Prime Minister’s ofce. This largely means that private media ownership is the domain of businessmen loyal to the regime. The largest media owner in the country by far was, until fairly recently, Rami Makhlouf, the maternal cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad, and one of the wealthiest men in Syria. Makhlouf’s spectacular and highly-publicized fallout with Al-Assad in mid-2020 leaves a question mark around how his media and telecommunications interests (which, alongside the rest of his wealth, are currently under state custody) will be distributed. Makhlouf, along with Mohammad Hamsho, a businessman close to Assad’s brother Maher Al-Assad, controls the only private news television station, Sama TV(formerly Addounia TV). Makhlouf also owns outright Ninar FM, an entertainment and music radio station, and Sham FM, a news radio station in addition to the largest private daily newspaper, Al-Watan, and its fnancial sister weekly, Al-Iqtissadiya. Samer Foz, another business tycoon with close links to the Syrian regime, owns the entertainment television station Lana TV, and one of the largest media production houses, Sama Al-Fan (SAPI). The United Group (UG), a media publishing and advertising company, which previously published the only other private political daily, Baladna, along with an assortment of other entertainment and specialist magazines, is owned by Majd Suleiman, the son of Bahjat Suleiman, a former director in the state security apparatus and current ambassador to Jordan. Other private media outlets, mostly entertainment-focused radio stations, are also controlled by the regime-crony businessmen nexus.
The Syrian economy has been severely damaged by the ongoing war, declining by more than 70% since 2011. This, along with European and US sanctions on the Syrian regime and individuals and businesses linked to it—both Makhlouf and Foz are on the US Treasury Department’s sanctions list—has led to an exodus of Syrian capital to neighboring countries. The UG media conglomerate, for example, moved most of its regional operations, which include the weekly classifed paper Al-Waseetand the Lebanese daily Al-Balad, to the Dubai-based AWI Company. This was also the case for Syrian television drama production, a substantial sector before the war, which moved much of its productions to other countries, such as the UAE, Egypt, and Lebanon. For instance, Foz’s SAPI production company, one of the largest television drama producers, moved its operations to Dubai.
The fight of Syrian capital as led to stagnation in media production within the country. Additionally, the collapse in the living standards of ordinary Syrians, both within and outside the country, has meant that the advertisement market for media outlets is extremely limited. Syrian media, in all three diferent spheres, are dependent on outside funding for their operations. In the case of regime-oriented media, this funding is usually funneled through well-connected, wealthy owners. In the case of oppositional and Kurdish media, such as Enab Balad and Arta FM, this funding sometimes comes from European and US development aid which is usually more transparent and is managed by specialized intermediary media development organizations. Less transparent, however, is the direct funding from foreign governments to media outlets such as Syria TV(with funds from Qatar) or new radio stations in former ISIS territories (with funds from France and the US). This lack of sustainable business models for Syrian media outlets means they are heavily dependent on their wealthy backers, or the priorities and policies of donor bodies and governments. This makes for an extremely precarious condition for the organizations and the media workers and limits their scope for professionalization or institutionalization.
international relations. The law additionally established the Higher Council for Media, which is tasked with regulating the media sector in Rojava. The Council’s 15 members are elected by the media professionals, outlets, and professional syndicates active in Rojava. It has the right to grant and revoke licenses to operate in the region for local and foreign media, as well as freelance journalists.The media scene in Rojava is largely dominated by the autonomous administration-owned state media organ Ronahi. The organization runs the main satellite television station that broadcasts from the region, as well as the main semi-daily print newspaper of the same name. It broadcasts mostly in Kurdish, with special programming in Arabic and English. Ronahi’s coverage leans heavily in favor of the PYD as the most dominant political force in Rojava. At the same time, most other political parties publish their own political newspapers, albeit with limited distribution. This includes parties afliated with the Kurdish National Council, the main anti-PYD coalition in the region. Furthermore, a signifcant number of media outlets exist that are not ofcially linked to political parties. These media are mostly small community radio stations, print magazines, and news websites linked to civil society organizations and are dependent on media development aid and the limited advertising market for survival. The exception is Arta FM, which started as a community radio based in Amouda with support from European and US media development organizations and has become the largest independent media active in Rojava. This station broadcasts over the whole region and runs a sister station in Raqqa aimed at the mostly Arab population (Badran & De Angelis, 2016)