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Meta-ethics is the branch of philosophical ethics that asks how we understand, know about, and what we mean when we talk about what is right and what is wrong.Earlier, the Scottish philosopher David Hume had put forward a similar view on the difference between facts and values.For example, Aristotle implies that less precise knowledge is possible in ethics than in other spheres of inquiry, and he regards ethical knowledge as depending upon habit and acculturation in a way that makes it distinctive from other kinds of knowledge.Studies of how we know in ethics divide into cognitivism and non- cognitivism; these, respectively, take descriptive and non-descriptive approaches to moral goodness or value.The ontology of ethics is about value-bearing things or properties, that is, the kind of things or stuff referred to by ethical propositions.Non-descriptivists and non-cognitivists believe that ethics does not need a specific ontology since ethical propositions do not refer.Realists, on the other hand, must explain what kind of entities, properties or states are relevant for ethics, how they have value, and why they guide and motivate our actions.

Meta-ethics is the branch of philosophical ethics that asks how we understand, know about, and what we mean when we talk about what is right and what is wrong. An ethical question pertaining to a particular practical situation such as, "Should I eat this particular piece of chocolate cake?"- cannot be a meta-ethical question (rather, this is an applied ethical question). A meta-ethical question is abstract and relates to a wide range of more specific practical questions. For example, "Is it ever possible to have a secure knowledge of what is right and wrong?" is a meta-ethical question. Seta-ethics has always accompanied philosophical ethics. For example, Aristotle implies that less precise knowledge is possible in ethics than in other spheres of inquiry, and he regards ethical knowledge as depending upon habit and acculturation in a way that makes it distinctive from other kinds of knowledge. Meta-ethics is also important in G.E. Moore's Principia
Ethica from 1903. In it he first wrote about what he called the naturalistic
fallacy. Moore was seen to reject naturalism in ethics, in his open-question
argument. This made thinkers look again at second order questions about
ethics. Earlier, the Scottish philosopher David Hume had put forward a
similar view on the difference between facts and values. Studies of how we know in ethics divide into cognitivism and non- cognitivism; these, respectively, take descriptive and non-descriptive approaches to moral goodness or value. Non-cognitivism is the view that when we judge something as morally right or wrong, this is neither true nor false. We may, for example, be only expressing our emotional feelings about these things. Cognitivism can then be seen as the claim that when we talk about right and wrong, we are talking about matters of fact.
The ontology of ethics is about value-bearing things or properties, that is, the kind of things or stuff referred to by ethical propositions. Non-descriptivists and non-cognitivists believe that ethics does not need a specific ontology
since ethical propositions do not refer. This is known as an anti-realist position. Realists, on the other hand, must explain what kind of entities, properties or states are relevant for ethics, how they have value, and why they guide and motivate our actions.